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I. INTRODUCTION
In the history ofeconomie thought the Keynesian revolutionis usually
presented as the breakthrough of a new theory, marking a break with
classical economics. By concentrating on the problem of effective
demand, this new theory could explain the phenomenon oflarge invo-
luntaryunemployment. Throughprovidinga rationalefor government
intervention it also dealt a serious blow to the until then dominating
laissez-faire ideology1. The main protagonist ofthis "revolution" was
John Maynard Keynes. However, there are some differences between
the "true" economics of Keynes and the interpretation ofhis work by
different schools of Keynesians, differences which can be accounted
for by theoretical disagreements and ideological prejudices.
In this paper we claim that this traditional account ofthe Keynesian
revolution neglectsoneofits mostimportantaspects, i.e. themethodo-
logical one. We will argue that the so-called "Keynesian revolution"
concerns much more than theory alone, but is also characterised by,
what we will consider as a "methodological revolution". This "metho-
dological revolution" manifests itself in the breakthrough of positi-
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81vism, a term, however, which should be interpreted carefully. We will
try to show that this (methodological) point ofview also throws a new
light on the difficult question of the exact relationship between the
economics of Keynes and the "Keynesian revolution".
11. THE "KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION": MUCH MORE THAN
THEORY ALONE
It is quite obvious that the dramatic changes which occurred in econo-
mics in the nineteen thirties and fourties had an important theoretical
component. The theoretical contextofthis so-called "Keynesian revo-
lution" is well known. Whereas in classical economics unemployment
was a symptom of a badly functioning labour market, it is now percei-
ved as being caused by a deficiency ofeffective demand on the goods
market. The new therapy, following logically from the analysis, is
exactly the one suggested by most economists at the time: increase
effective demand through government spending.
This theoretical (and political) component is only part of the story
however. To draw a complete picture of the "scientific revolution" of
the thirties andfourties we have to takeinto account some methodolo-
gical developments.
Although Keynes in the "GeneralTheory" did notprovide a mathe-
matical model of the theory of unemployment, it is undeniable that
"Keynesian" economics has been rather mathematically inclined.
After World War 11 the formalisation of economic theory proceeded
ratherrapidly and, althoughits mainfocus canbelocatedin micro-eco-
nomic theory, macro-economics certainly did not stay immune for it.
In other words, the "mathematical revolution", emphasised by Ward
(1972)2, was not independent of the "Keynesian revolution". We can
illustrate this statement with an example. Before 1930 economists
wanting to construct a formal theory usually formulated one equation
andthenstartedarguingaroundthe differentvariablesoftheequation.
A beautiful example is Keynes' "Tract on Monetary Reform". He
there formulates the quantity theory as n= p.k. with n as the currency
notes or other forms ofcash in circulation with the public, p the price
of a consumption unit and k the amount ofreal purchasing power the
public holds in the form of money. The main point of the exposition
is then the discussion of the interrelationships between the different
variables. This approach can be contrasted with the one adopted by
82Hicks (1937) in his famous article "Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics', A
Suggested Interpretation", which probably was the starting point for
most research in the following years. Hicks first summarises the classi-
cal position and Keynes' position,eachin threeequations. Hecriticises
them both and proposes three, more generalequations, encompassing
both positions as special cases, depending upon the parameters ofthe
money demand equation. Thepointofthisstory is clear: mathematical
model-thinking was an integral part of the "Keynesian revolution"
from its early beginning3.
Besides the "mathematicalrevolution" there was anotherimportant
phenomenon in the thirties: the increase in the quantity and quality of
the available macro-economie data, brought aboutmainly by the orga-
nisation ofofficial governmentagencies with the aim tomeasure natio-
nal income (expenditure, product) and its components. This trend is
associated mainly with the names of Simon Kuznets in the United
States and Colin Clark and Richard Stone in Great-Britain. Patinkin
(1976a) explores the relationships between this "statistical revolu-
tion", as he calls it, and the Keynesian one described earlier4. The
pre-Keynesian theories of the business cycle directed the statistical
efforts towards themeasurement ofinvestment. Theseearly estimates
were then used (e.g. by Keynes) to support the "theoretical revolu-
tion". An analogous "dialecticaI" relationship between datagathering
and theoretical work also existed afterthe thirties, the new macroeco-
nomie model offering a useful frame of reference for the elaboration
and refinement of statistical measurement, which, in turn, permitted
further theoretical developments.
In first instanee, the data were mainly used to "illustrate" the theo-
retical discussions. Butas their quality increased andthe macroecono-
mie discussions were more and more cast in the form ofmathematical
modeIs, thefoundations werelaidfora newfundamental "revolution",
the "econometrie revolution"5. Here also there was a dialectical rela-
tionship6. On the one hand, it is undeniable that the growth ofKeyne-
sian macroeconomics was impregnated by econometrics. A lot of
empirical research tried to estimate the parameters of the Hicksian
model: the consumption function, the investment function and the
liquidity-preference function. On the other hand it can also be argued
that econometricians needed the Keynesian revolution. Of course, a
lot ofeconometrie research was purely methodologieal, and the work
done after World War 11 around the Cowles Commission by a group
ofactive and highly influential researchers was directed partly towards
83the solution of rather abstract statistical problems. Nevertheless, the
enthusiasmwould have beenmuch smaller, iftherehadbeennopoten-
tial immediate applications. These possibilitieswereofferedby Keyne-
sian macroeconomics. Econometricians were quite aware of the fact
that they only elaborated a tooI and that they had to rely on theory to
provide them with adequate specifications. Because of its theoretical
and social relevancy the Keynesian framework in this respect domina-
ted all its competitors. Moreover it had the decisive advantage to be
formulated on a highly aggregative level and to suggest easy and ade-
quate definitions ofthe variables. Because of the interaction with the
statisticians observational data on these variables were readily availa-
bIe. ItthencancausenosurprisethatthepathbreakingworkofTinber-
gen in the thirties was concerned with business cycletheory and that
macroeconomics remained thefavourite field for application ofecono-
metrics.
It must have become clear by now that a separate investigation of
the theoretical developments during the "Keynesian revolution" can
only be undertaken at the risk ofgetting biased interpretations ofthe
overall evolution. This overall evolution cannot be understood if we
neglect the complex interplay oftheoretical (Keynesian), mathemati-
cal, statistical andeconometric "revolutions". Moreover, these "revo-
lutions" have to be projected on the philosophical background of the
time.
lIl. A POSITIVIST BREAKTHROUGH IN THE THIRTIES
Duringthe thirties andfourties positivistideas, which originatedinthe
nineteenth century, were evolving towards more logical-positivist or
logical-empiricist philosophies of science, under the influence of the
Vienna Circle7. In economics T. Hutchison has become the most
influential advocate of these ideas. He argued (in 1938!) that logical
analysis and empirical investigations are the two pillars of science:
"The scientist proceeds by means ofthe two inextricable interconnec-
ted activities of empirical investigation and logical analysis, the ane,
briefly, being concerned with the behaviour of facts, and the other
with the language in which this is to be discussed"8.It is illuminating
to confront this quotation with the picture ofthe Keynesian revolution
sketched earlier. Obviously, mathematical model buildinghas become
the language ofKeynesian economics, their vehicle oflogical analysis,
84while econometric testing has become its favorite method ofempirical
investigation. Apart from its theoretical aspects, the "Keynesian"
revolution secured the definitive (?) triumph of the logical-empirical
methodology andits success partlycan be accountedfor by thegrowing
attraction of a more positivist methodology. On the other hand, it is
also true that the success of Keynesian economics contributed to the
acceptance of a more positivist methodology in economics.
In this respect two important points should be stressed. In the first
place we must admit that the conceptof"positivism" is very vague and
indeed is covering (and has covered) a lot of different contents. Per-
haps we can argue that in economics it standsfor a procedure,whereby
one starts with some well-defined premises, assumptions, then cons-
tructs a logical-deductive reasoning (preferably mathematic), to arrive
finally at a set of operationally-formulated "causallaws". These laws
make prediction possible. Predictions should be confronted with rea-
lity to test whether the theory holds (preferably with statistical
methods). The vagueness of this description reproduces rather weil
the vagueness with which the term is used by economists. One could
even argue that the confusion around the concept partly explains its
success. Indeed, and this is the second important remark, the practice
of economists does only partially come up to the expectations of the
methodologists. Since the strong criticism of Hutchison (1938) this
pointhasrepeatedly beenstressedbydifferentauthors. Theygenerally
agree that economists pay too much attention to deduction and
(mathematical) theory construction and neglect the systematical con-
frontation of theory with fact. "Much empirical work in economics is
like playing tennis with the net down"9.
Although we agree that it is difficult to give an adequate definition
of"positivism" and that there sometimesis a gap between the practice
of economists and the prescriptions of the methodologists, we never-
theless think that the main idea is clear enough and may help us to
interpret the "Keynesianrevolution". Inourview, historiansofecono-
mics have laid (relatively) too much stress on theoretical shifts in the
thirties and neglected the acceleration in the trend towards positivism.
In the following section we will try to show that our point ofview also
throws a new light on the Keynes versus the Keynesians-debate.
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METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The question ofthe exact relationship between the economics ofKey-
nes and the "Keynesian revolution" has been vigorously debated,
especially since the appearance in 1968 ofLeijonhufvud's "On Keyne-
sian economics and the Economics of Keynes" 10. But the aim of this
section is ratherdifferentfrom that ofmost otherpublications: indeed,
we do not try to reconstruct the "true" Keynes, nor do we want to
derive anynormative conclusions aboutthevalue ofKeynesian macro-
economics by comparison of its main tenets with those of its sacred
prophet. We only want to argue that the deviation from Keynes' work
can partlybeexplained by themethodologicaldevelopmentsdescribed
in the previous section.
A natural starting point for our discussion are Keynes' own writings
on methodologyll. Although these writings are not so abundant, they
suffice to sketch rather clearly his views. Keynes was very explicit in
a letterto Harrod: "Itseems to me that economics is a branchoflogic,
a way of thinking (...). Economics is a science of thinking in terms of
models joined to the art of choosing modeIs which are relevant to the
contemporary world."12. We should not conclude from this quotation
that Keyneswould have applaudedthemathematizationofeconomics.
On the contrary, in the General Theory he jeers at the "symbolic
pseudo-mathematicalmodels offormalizing asystem ofeconomieana-
lysis": "Too large a proportion of recent mathematical economics are
merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest
on, which allow the author to lose sight ofthe complexities and inter-
dependencies ofthe real world in a maze ofpretentions and unhelpful
symbols"13. Indeed, according to Keynes, "...economics is essentially
a moral science and not a natural science. That is to say, it employs
introspection and judgementsofvalue"14. Ofcourse, "... the specialist
in themanufactureofmodelswill notbesuccessful unlessheis constan-
tly correcting his judgment by intimate and messy acquaintance with
the facts to which his model has to be applied"15. This interest for the
facts of the real world does not imply the adoption of econometrie
methods at all: on the contrary Keynes (1939) wrote a devastating
critique ofTinbergen's work on business cycles, wherein he denies the
possibility of testing economie theories with regression techniques.
Later on, he compares econometrics with "black magie" and "alche-
my" and challenges statisticians to an experiment: "It will be remem-
86bered that the seventy translators of the Septuagint were shut up in
seventy separate rooms with the Hebrew text and brought out with
them, when they emerged, seventy identical translations. Would the
same miracle be vouchsafed if seventy multiple correlators were shut
up with the same statistical material? And anyhow, I suppose, if each
had a different economist perched on his a priori, that would make a
difference to the outcome"16.
These few quotations clearlyillustrate thesharpdistinction between
Keynes' methodological ideas and the practice of economists in the
post-war period. Patinkin (1976a) tries to sugar the pill by noting that
the "Treatise on Money" was a formalistic and mathematically orien-
ted work and that Keynes was one ofthe first fellows ofthe Econome-
tric Society and even elected president in 1944. Itstill remains a rather
ironical trick of history that Keynes, who claims to repel very firmly
"attempts to turn economics into a pseudo-natural science" 17, has
given its name to a "revolution", which definitely put the seal upon
the succes of positivism in economics.
Let us now have a look at some theoretical issues. One ofthe domi-
nantfeatures ofthe "Keynesianrevolution" is the victory oftheWalra-
sian research programme over the Marshallian, thanks to the innova-
tive work ofHicks, Allen and Samuelson18. This development was in
line with the trend towards mathematization and formalisation, but
departed from Keynes' terminology and methodology. His use of an
aggregate supply and demand function and ofthe concepts ofdemand
price and supply price, his partial equilibrium approach and the tac-
kling of the problem of time with the different periods concept, all
show how deeply impregnated he was by Marshalls Principles19.
A more basic problem is the role of money and the analysis of
disequilibrium. For Keynes, the monetary aspect ofthe economy was
immediately connected with the overwhelming importance of uncer-
tainty, and exactly this point was for him (one of) the main innova-
tion(s) of his General Theory. Most participants in the "Keynes and
the Keynesians" - debate agree on this point: while Keynes uses equi-
librium analysis as an analytical tooI, he was fundamentally interested
in the analysis of a monetary economy in turmoil. It is therefore stri-
king that this concern with disequilibrium processes remained largely
out of the interest of mainstream macroeconomics. Money is not a
source ofinstability anymore: itplays no role at all in an exposition of
the 45°-graph, while in the IS-LM-model there is only a place for a
87demand for money function, which is a stabIe function of income and
the interest rate2Ü.
How is this biased Keynes-interpretation ofmainstream economists
to be explained? The usual answer is well-known: one can claim that
ideological considerations, particularly the wish to defend the existing
class structure of society, made it impossible for many conservative
economists to accept the idea that capitalism is fundamentally unsta-
bIe. We claim that this answer is only a partial one. The General
Theory, although containing a message ofdisequilibrium, gives a com-
parative static analysis21. Moggridge (1976) notes that it differed in
this respect from the "Treatise on Money", which had been cast in a
sequential framework, particularly adapted for dealing with disequili-
brium situations. This shift was not really a voluntary choice, but the
technical problems raised by the "disequilibrium" approach were so
difficult, that they forced Keynes to change his mode of analysis in
order to reach his overall purpose, which was the diffusion of some
fundamental ideas and policy options. Leijonhufvud also writes: "Sta-
tic, equilibrium modelling was the only technical form that we can
reasonably say was available to him"22. Itis clearthatthe same techni-
cal problems existed for Keynes' successors. These were moreover, as
distinct from Keynes, strongly impressed by the aesthetical value of
the Walrasian framework. Technicallimitations and infatuation with
the beauty of the Walrasian scheme seem to be the most fundamental
explanation for the stress on equilibrating factors in mainstream eco-
nomics after Keynes. Ifthis hypothesis is provisionally accepted, one
can derive from it aprediction: if new techniques could be developed
to treat adequately disequilibrium situations, the emphasiswould shift
again. The evidence of the last years has certainly not falsified this
prediction. Since the publication ofthe paper ofBarro and Grossman
(1971) there has been a lot of work on disequilibrium economics and
"disequilibrium econometrics" anditis notexaggeratedto say thatthis
field ofresearchis nowadaysoneofthemostpromisingandexpanding.
We can now draw some conclusions. The evolution in the methodo-
logy ofmainstream economics after World War II was opposite to the
prescriptions of Keynes, even when it elaborated his very theoretical
framework. Thisis a clearillustrationofthestrongpowerofattraction,
exerted by the example of the positivistic successes of the natural
sciences. The positivistic ideal also coloured the theoretical Keynes-
interpretation by mainstream economics: only the components of his
theory that could be summarised in a neat, formal framework were
88taken into account. "Disequilibrium" ideas only made their way in
economics in recent years, because now the technical difficulties
appear to be solvable.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we tried to show that methodological aspects are very
importantifwe want to understand the revolution in economics during
the thirties and fourties. The "Keynesian", mathematical, statistical
and econometrie revolutions were not independent of each other but
probablyinseparable to sueh an extentthat no oneofthemwould have
had a deep influence without the others. Together they marked the
breakthrough of a more positivist methodology in economics. Also,
this tendency towards a positivist methodology partly explains the
difference between Keynes and his "Keynesian" successors.
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1. Cfr. Klein (1949), Robinson (1962), Meade (1975).
2. Ward (1972), pp. 40-44. Ward advances F. Ràmseyas thefirst economist in which
the mathematical style of arguing dominated.
3. For an overview ofthe development ofHicks' ideas and his impactonmacroecon-
mie and monetary theory, cfr. Maes (1984).
4. A summary is given in Patinkin (1976a), pp. 1110-1111.
5. For an interesting overview of the early history of econometrics, cfr. Darnell
(1983).
6. See also, for example, the important testimony ofTinbergen (1947).
7. For an overview of the development of positivism, cfr. CaldweIl (1980).
8. Hutchison (1938), p. 9.
9. B1aug (1976), p. 173.
10. Of course, the debate existed already before 1968. The Keynes-interpretation of
some ofhis Cambridge followers had always departed from the standard income-
expenditure model. See for instanee Robinson (1962), chapter 4.
11. For a more detailed analysis of Keynes' methodology, cfr. Maes (1983a).
12. Letter to R.F. Harrod, 4/7/38. Reprinted in Keynes (1973), p. 296.
13. Keynes (1936), p. 297.
14. Letter to R.F. Harrod, 4/7/38. Reprinted in Keynes (1973), p. 297.
IS. Letter to R.F. Harrod, 16/7/38. Reprinted in Keynes (1973), p. 300.
16. "Comment" in the Economie Journal, march 1940. Reprinted in Keynes (1973),
pp.319-320.
17. Letter to R.F. Harrod, 4/7/38. Reprinted in Keynes (1973), p. 296.
8918. For a characterisation ofthe Walrasian and Marshallian approach to economics,
see Leijonhufvud (1974).
19. Patinkin is here not so convincing in attributing a general-equilibrium analysis to
Keynes, cfr. Maes (1983b), p. 102.
20. See also Johnson (1962), pp. 39-43.
21. Leijonhufvud (1968), p. 36 writes: "His model was statie, but his theory was
dynamic". This accords also with Patinkin's analysis, see Patinkin (1976b), pp.
116-119.
22. Leijonhufvud (1976), p. 94.
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